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INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1 
 
The National Black Law Students Association 
(“NBLSA”) submits this brief as amicus curiae in 
support of Petitioner.  NBLSA is a membership 
organization formed in 1968 to promote the 
educational, professional, political, and social 
objectives of Black law students. Today, NBLSA is 
the largest student-run organization in the United 
States, with nearly 6,000 members, over 200 
chapters in our nation’s law schools, and six 
international chapters or affiliates. NBLSA 
maintains an interest in the development of 
jurisprudence which guards against racial 
discrimination and promotes a positive legal 
framework for addressing matters of civil and 
constitutional rights. Accordingly, NBLSA has a 
substantial interest in the outcome of this litigation.  
 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 
On July 14, 2016, President Barack Obama, 
speaking at a town hall on race relations, 
acknowledged “what is true for me is true for a lot of 
African-American men—is there’s a greater 
presumption of dangerousness that arises from the 
social and cultural perceptions that have been fed to 
folks for a long time . . . And I think it is not as bad 
as it used to be, but it's still there, and there's a 
                                               
1 The parties have consented to the filing of this brief. No 
counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and 
no counsel or party made a monetary contribution intended to 
fund the preparation or submission of this brief. No person 
other than amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel made a 









history to that.”2 In phrasing the notion of Black 
dangerousness in such personal terms, President 
Obama undoubtedly did not mean to suggest that 
most ordinary Americans regard him as dangerous 
and prone to criminality.  The vast majority of 
Americans no more look upon President Obama as 
inherently dangerous than they would the Black 
physician who treats them in the emergency room, 
the Black firefighter who responds to a call at their 
home, the Black teacher who speaks with them at a 
parent-teacher conference, or the Black attorney who 
appears before them at the bench.  But faced with an 
unfamiliar stranger, placed in stressful 
circumstances, presented with a criminal defendant, 
even well-meaning people fall prey to the stereotype 
that, whether for reason of biology or culture, Black 
people are inherently violent and dangerous. 
 
This narrative of dangerousness reaches back 
to slavery when Black people were believed to be not 
just inferior, but also savage brutes prone to violence 
and criminality unless domesticated and made 
docile.  Conceived as a popular philosophy, the 
narrative evolved into a respected scientific doctrine, 
positing that the very physical attributes of Black 
people—from the darkness of their skin, to the 
broadness of their nose, to the coarseness of their 
hair—were biological manifestations of a lesser-
evolved human form.  When the Civil War ended, 
conventional wisdom held that freedom made 
evident in Blacks what slavery had kept hidden by 
                                               
2 ABC News, President Obama and the People Town Hall: A 
National Conversation, YOUTUBE (July 15, 2016), 










giving “loose reins to the animal.”3 During 
Reconstruction and through Jim Crow, as Black 
Codes in the South and discriminatory policing in 
the North literally criminalized Blackness, sociology 
and statistics replaced Darwinism and eugenics in 
arguing for innate Black criminality.  In the so-
called progressive era, well-meaning reformers 
advocated for more humane treatment of criminals 
but still warned that the Black criminal was a breed 
apart because the propensity for crime revealed the 
faults of an immature race.   
 
The narrative of Black criminality is not some 
vestigial relic of a long dead past. The most rigorous 
cognitive and psychological scientific research of the 
last sixty years has shown that even in our own 
enlightened modern times, vast segments of society 
hold the belief that Blacks and Whites occupy 
different moral universes, that Blacks are more 
prone to criminality than Whites, and that the most 
salient aspects of Black character are “laziness, 
murderous violence, and sexual intemperance.”4  As 
recently as June 2016, a Reuters/Ipsos public opinion 
poll revealed that a shockingly high number of 
people of all political stripes described Blacks as 
unintelligent, lazy, violent, and criminal.5  
                                               
3 Eugene R. Corson, The Future of the Colored Race in the 
United States from an Ethnic and Medical Standpoint, 15 N.Y. 
MED. TIMES 193, 201 (1877); EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE 
AFRICAN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIENCE: A 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 149–50 (Robert P. Green, Jr. 2000). 
4 ROBERT M. ENTMAN & ANDREW ROJECKI, THE BLACK IMAGE IN 
THE WHITE MIND: MEDIA AND RACE IN AMERICA 41 (2010). 
5 Emily Flitter & Chris Kahn, Exclusive: Trump Supporters 
More Likely to View Blacks Negatively, REUTERS (June 28, 











So, when an expert witness told the jury that 
Mr. Buck was dangerous because he is Black, he 
dredged up into the open for all members of the jury 
to see the monstrous specter that is never far from 
the surface: the violent Black brute, the single most 
fearful, dehumanizing, and cruel stereotype Black 
people have had to endure.  In so doing, he did not 
just make a passing reference to race; he made race 
the central question for determining whether Mr. 
Buck should be put to death.  This is constitutionally 
and morally indefensible. 
 
Any procedure that bars review of a death 
sentence must give way to the greater constitutional 
and moral imperative of ferreting out impermissible 
appeals to a defendant’s race. Historically, Black 
defendants have been subjected to greater rates of 
charging, higher rates of conviction, and longer and 
harsher sentences.  This Court has worked 
deliberately to correct these disparities, to exorcise 
race from our criminal justice system, and to develop 
a jurisprudence that fosters justice and equity. 
Therefore, this Court should not now let stand a 
procedural bar to consideration of a defendant’s 













I. THERE IS DEEPLY ROOTED IN OUR HISTORY, 
INDELIBLY STAMPED IN OUR PSYCHE, AND 
STUBBORNLY PRESENT IN OUR CULTURE A 
CRUEL AND DEHUMANIZING STEREOTYPE THAT 
BLACK PEOPLE ARE UNIQUELY VIOLENT AND 
DANGEROUS  
 
A. The Ideology of Slavery Held as Its 
Fundamental Tenet that Blacks Were 
by Their Nature Savage Brutes Prone 
to Violence and Criminality Unless 
Domesticated and Made Docile by the 
Firm Hand of a White Master 
 
Thomas Jefferson believed that “the blacks, 
whether originally a distinct race, or made distinct 
by time and circumstances, are inferior to the whites 
in the endowments both of body and mind.”6  Though 
he conceded he did not have much evidence to back 
up his opinion, he still insisted that “in general their 
existence appears to participate more of sensation 
than reflection.”7  In Jefferson’s time the racial 
prejudice that would eventually lead White 
Americans to conclude that “black men were not 
really men but cattle,”8 had not yet quite hardened 
into an ideology of race that posited that Black 
people were biologically a lower life form. However, 
in both North and South, among both slaveholders 
and abolitionists, the belief that Black people were 
an alien and dangerous presence gained wide 
currency in early Nineteenth century America.   
 
                                               
6 THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 150 
(1832). 
7 Id. at 146. 









After Virginia briefly considered but 
ultimately rejected legislative proposals that would 
have led to emancipation, Professor Thomas R. Dew 
of William and Mary College explained that Black 
people were unfit for emancipation because they 
were “differing from us in color and habits and 
vastly inferior in the scale of civilization.”9 Like 
Jefferson, Dew concluded that the supposed indolent 
and violent nature of Black people resulted from “an 
inherent and intrinsic cause.”10 Defending slavery 
from abolitionist argument, William Drayton, a 
Charleston lawyer, argued that “personal 
observation must convince every candid man that 
the negro is constitutionally indolent, voluptuous, 
and prone to vice, that his mind is heavy, dull, and 
unambitious, that the doom that has made the 
African in all ages and countries, a slave—is the 
natural consequence of the inferiority of his 
character.”11   
 
Even Northern abolitionists were not 
altogether free of the idea of Black criminality. A 
group of New Jersey abolitionists cautioned that free 
Blacks “were given to idleness, frolicking, 
drunkenness, and in some few cases dishonesty.”12  
A Philadelphia abolitionist “described most 
                                               
9 GEORGE M. FREDERICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE 
MIND: THE DEBATE ON AFRO-AMERICAN CHARACTER AND 
DESTINY, 1817–1914 45 (1987) 
10 Thomas R. Dew, Professor Dew on Slavery, in THE PRO-
SLAVERY ARGUMENT 287, 429 (1853). 
11 WILLIAM DRAYTON, THE SOUTH VINDICATED FROM THE 
TREASON AND FANATICISM OF THE NORTHERN ABOLITIONISTS 232 
(1836). 
12 TALI MENDELBERG, RACE CARD: CAMPAIGN STRATEGY, 









Philadelphia negroes as degraded and vicious.”13 A 
New York abolitionist society bemoaned “the 
looseness of manners and depravity of conduct in 
many of the persons of Colour in this city.”14 
Alarmed by what it perceived as the “depravity of 
the negro,” and concerned about Blacks becoming 
“both injurious and burdensome,” the Massachusetts 
legislature appointed a committee to study 
restricting Black immigration to the state.15 
 
The doctrine of inherent Black inferiority first 
began as a popular emotional justification for 
slavery.  However, it soon became “the basis of a 
world view, an explicit ideology around which the 
beneficiaries of white supremacy could organize 
themselves and their thoughts.”16  Central to this 
worldview was the notion that Black people were not 
just inferior, but also and more importantly that 
they were by their very nature savage brutes prone 
to violence and criminality unless “domesticated” 
and made docile in slavery.  Thus, in order to 
reconcile the notion of Blacks as “naturally 
mendacious …and thievish”17 with the Southern 
claim of slaves as “contented, peaceful and 
harmless,”18 proslavery propagandists conjured up 
the concept of the duality of negro character: 
 
According to this theory, the Negro was 
by nature a savage brute.  Under 
                                               
13 FREDERICKSON, supra note 9, at 4. 
14 ARTHUR ZILVERSMIT, THE FIRST EMANCIPATION: THE 
ABOLITION OF SLAVERY IN THE NORTH 223–24 (1967). 
15 Id. at 225. 
16 FREDERICKSON, supra note 9, at 47. 
17 WILLIAM GOODELL, THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE IN THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 17 (1853). 









slavery, however, he was domesticated 
or, to a limited degree, civilized.  Hence 
docility was not so much his natural 
character as an artificial creation of 
slavery.  As long as the control of the 
master was firm and assured, the slave 
would be happy, loyal and affectionate; 
but remove or weaken the authority of 
the master, and he would revert to type 
as bloodthirsty savage.19 
 
In the decades preceding the Civil War, the 
popular philosophy of the dual Black character 
evolved into a respected scientific doctrine.  In 1839, 
Dr. Samuel George Morton published, CRANIA 
AMERICANA, or what he called an empirical study of 
racial differences.  According to Morton, careful 
examination of the size and shapes of different types 
of men led to the inevitable conclusion that Blacks 
represented an altogether different species.20 Dr. 
Josiah Nott, an ethnologist originally from Mobile, 
Alabama who would later become the Dean of the 
School of Science at Harvard University, firmly 
believed that Africa was the homeland of “a 
succession of human beings with intellects as dark 
as their skins,”21 and “attempted to convince 
educated Americans that the Negro was not a blood 
brother to the whites.”22 Relying in part on 
measurements of skull capacities, facial features, 
and even hair textures of Black and White cadavers, 
Nott concluded that the anatomical differences 
                                               
19 Id. at 53–54. 
20 Id. at 74–75. 
21 MARLI F. WEINER & MAIZE HOUGH, SEX, SICKNESS AND 
SLAVERY: ILLNESS IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 18 (2012). 









between Whites and Blacks were “greater than the 
differences in the skeleton of the Wolf, Dog and 
Hyena, which are allowed to be distinct species.”23  
 
Though Nott was indisputably a White 
racialist committed to the cause of slavery, his views 
of Black savagery were made respectable by a veneer 
of scientific discourse.  Thus, in 1851, John 
Campbell, a prominent scholar, was able to use 
Nott’s work to publish a remarkable volume titled 
Negro-Mania, in which he summarized the scientific 
consensus on Black savagery: 
 
We every where find proofs of . . . 
inflexible cruelty, selfishness and 
disposition to cheat, a want of all 
sympathetic impulses and feelings, the 
most brutal apathy and indolence, 
unless roused by the pressure of 
physical want, or stimulated by the 
desire of revenge and the thirst of 
blood.24  
 
B. In the Post Civil War Era, Scientists 
Maintained that No Greater Menace 
Faced the Nation than the Threat 
Posed by the “Load of African Negro 
Blood” 
 
The Civil War brought former slaves 
“suddenly, violently …in a new birthright, at a time 
                                               
23 JOSIAH NOTT, TWO LECTURES ON THE NATURAL HISTORY OF 
THE CAUCASIAN AND NEGRO RACES 25 (1844). 
24 JOHN CAMPBELL, NEGRO-MANIA: BEING AN EXAMINATION OF 
THE FALSELY ASSUMED EQUALITY OF THE VARIOUS RACES OF 









of war and passion, in the midst of the stricken, 
embittered population of their former masters.”25  
Post-bellum scientists took stock of these new 
birthright citizens and concluded that “during 
slavery . . . so far as the merely physical man was 
concerned they were better off . . . But since the war 
and emancipation things have reversed; freedom 
gave loose reins to the animal.”26  Chief among 
scientists warning about Black criminality was Nott.  
In an influential article titled “The Negro Problem,” 
he explained that Blacks were “bred first in a 
savagery that had never been broken by the least 
efforts towards a higher state.”27  He insisted that 
“judged by the light of all experience, these people 
are a danger to America greater and more 
insuperable than any of those that menace the other 
great civilized states of the world,” and that no 
challenge facing the country was as great as 
“compared to this load of African negro blood that an 
evil past has imposed upon us.”28  
 
While Nott harbored no doubt about the 
inherent criminality of Black people, he cautioned 
that more research was needed to fully understand 
its origins.  The American ethnographers, 
anthropologists, physicians, penologists and 
statisticians who took up the call for more research 
almost uniformly concluded, as did Henry Martin 
Boies, a leading penologist, that Blacks were prone 
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to criminality because they had “strong animalism 
by nature and cultivation,” which resulted in a lack 
of “virtue and little moral restraint.”29  
 
Greatly influenced by social Darwinism, 
eugenics and other European theories of hereditary 
criminality, post-bellum social scientists “largely 
understood criminals as falling into one of two 
categories: occasional and habitual.  Most crime 
stemmed from poverty, poor environment, and poor 
moral training, typical motivating factors for 
occasional criminality.  Habitual criminals, however, 
were biologically deficient and morally bankrupt 
individuals.”30  To these scientists, “habitual 
criminals possessed common atavistic traits—
physical and mental characteristics that otherwise 
distinguished them from normal human beings.” 
Superimposed upon what Charles Sumner called the 
“oligarchy of the skin,”31 eugenist theories of 
criminality as being hereditary effectively equated 
Black skin with criminal traits. As such, Americans 
“envisioned civilized White heterosexual society in a 
perilous battle not simply to maintain social, 
political, and moral authority, but also to preserve 
their gene pool and the sanctity of whiteness.”32   
 
Of course, the tragic irony is that many of 
these scientists and reformers warning of the 
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dangers of Black criminality in the post-bellum era 
were able to offer what seemed to be irrefutable data 
of a wave of Black crime at the end of the Civil War. 
That is because the Black Codes enacted by every 
single Southern state had succeeded in essentially 
criminalizing Blackness.33 To social scientists 
studying crime in America, the innate criminal 
nature of Black people rather than Southern Black 
Codes and Northern racial discrimination served to 
explain the seeming prevalence of crime in the Black 
population.  In fact, the notion of Blacks as 
inherently criminal gained wide purchase in the 
post-bellum years in part because most of the 
scientists advancing that theory claimed to be 
dispassionate truth seekers free of irrational racial 
prejudice.   
 
Thus, in 1896, the same year this Court 
validated American racial apartheid in Plessy v. 
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), Frederick Ludwig 
Hoffman, a German-born and educated actuary and 
statistician from Prudential Insurance Company, 
published a study warning that freedom had made 
evident an aspect of the Black character that slavery 
had managed to keep hidden: a propensity for 
criminality.34  Specifically, Hoffman observed that in 
slavery it was “well known that neither crime [nor] 
pauperism existed.”35 But, using data from the 1890 
census, Hoffman showed that, while Blacks were 
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only 12 percent of the population, they represented 
30 percent of all prisoners, 30 percent of those 
imprisoned for violent crimes, 41 percent of those 
imprisoned for rape, and nearly 50 percent of those 
imprisoned for arson.36  While the numbers 
appeared, as Hoffman put it, to speak for 
themselves, in truth Hoffman’s statistics were part 
of a carefully crafted racial narrative all the more 
pernicious for seemingly being scientifically neutral. 
Hoffman’s own data showed crime statistics for 
Blacks were no different than those of immigrants 
and poor Whites.  But, whereas Hoffman explained 
crime among poor White immigrants as a function of 
economic deprivation and societal discrimination, he 
insisted that crime among Black people was a 
function of innate characteristics. Hoffman’s use of 
data was revolutionary because he “combined crime 
statistics with a well-crafted white supremacist 
narrative to shape the reading of black criminality 
while trying to minimize the appearance of doing 
so.”37 Indeed, by carefully reporting not just crime 
statics but also data showing increase in education 
among Blacks, Hoffman was able to argue that 
beneficial social institutions such as schools and 
churches that would normally have civilizing effects 
on White criminals had no impact on Blacks. His 
words bear reproducing in full: 
 
I have given the statistics of the general 
progress of the race in religion and 
education for the country at large, and 
have shown that in church and school 
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the number of attending members or 
pupils is constantly increasing; but in 
statistics of crime and the data of 
illegitimacy the proof is furnished that 
neither religion nor education has 
influenced to an appreciable degree the 
moral progress of the race.  Whatever 
benefit the individual colored man may 
have gained from the extension of 
religious worship and educational 
processes, the race as a whole has gone 
backwards rather than forwards.38 
 
C. The Progressive Era Exchanged the 
Biological Determinism of Black 
Individuals Being Innately Violent 
with the Cultural Determinism of 
Black Communities Being Peculiarly 
Tolerant of Criminality  
 
At the turn of the twentieth century, social 
scientists and reformers abandoned theories of 
biological determinism equating Blackness with 
crime.  However, in search of an explanation for 
what they perceived as a disproportionate share of 
criminal behavior by Black people, arguably well-
meaning reformers and supposedly enlightened 
scientists exchanged one form of racial determinism 
for another: crime was unique to Blacks not by 
reason of their biology but by reason of their culture.  
That is to say, reformers explained White criminal 
behavior as a function of general socio-economic 
forces, but described Black criminal behavior as a 
function of particular Black culture. 
                                               










For example, Frances Kellor, a White female 
criminologist, traveled the South measuring body 
sizes and shapes of Black female prisoners to show 
that there were no inherent biological differences 
between Black and White criminals.39  However, 
looking at crime statistics, Kellor nonetheless drew 
an essentialist distinction between White and Black 
criminals: “The Negroes’ criminality is that of an 
undeveloped race…The Negroes’ crime show an 
absence of social and personal responsibility, and are 
an outgrowth of impulse rather than of well-laid 
plans and complicated schemings.”40 Frederic 
Bushee, a leading Boston reformer and author of 
immigrant life, noted the high crime rate in Irish 
and Italian communities.  He also remarked that 
they brought “many valuable traits to the American 
people,” and that “it is fortunate that they possess 
the characteristics which make them easily 
assimilable.”41  However, whereas rampant crime in 
immigrant communities did not prevent reformers 
like Bushee from understanding the nurturing of 
immigrants as key to the nation’s health, they 
remained adamant that culturally, Blacks were 
different: “The Negroes in general reveals the faults 
of an immature race” and that, unlike immigrants, 
assimilation into American society was “not 
desirable.”42 
 
As always, W.E.B. Du Bois put it best: 
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Murder may swagger, theft may rule 
and prostitution flourish, and the 
nation gives but a spasmodic, 
intermittent and lukewarm attention.  
But let the murderer be black or the 
thief brown or the violator of 
womanhood have but a drop of Negro 
blood, and the righteousness of the 
indignation sweeps the world.  Nor 
would this fact make the indignation 
less justifiable did not we all know that 
it was blackness that was condemned, 
and not the crime.43 
 
D. In the Modern Era, Subtle Skin-Color 
Coding of Dangerousness Ushered in 
the Rise of Hoodlums and Villains 
 
Between the two world wars and up until the 
modern civil rights movement, the naked racial 
theories that painted Blacks as black-hearted 
villains did not altogether disappear from 
mainstream consciousness.   Indeed, as the centuries 
progressed, the various malignancies associated with 
Blackness were conflated into a fearful specter of 
death and destruction.  The “bad classes of Negroes” 
seemed to grow larger each year; their criminal 
appetites and deviant sexual desires less easily sated 
than ever before.”44  In those years, the narrative of 
Black violence acquired explicit sexual overtones, in 
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which “two-legged monsters,” consumed by lust and 
“rotten” with venereal diseases posed a constant 
threat to White women.45  
 
However, with the advent of the civil rights 
movement, overt expressions of Black people as 
racial villains fell out of fashion, to be replaced with 
more coded but no less potent language.  To be sure, 
some still clung to overt biological claims.  Thus, in 
reaction to civil disorder and unrest growing out of 
civil rights protests, William Parker, then the Chief 
of Police for Los Angeles, explained “you cannot 
ignore the genes in the behavior pattern of people,” 
comparing Black “hoodlums” to monkeys in a zoo.46  
But for the most part, descriptions of Black 
criminality became more coded and subtle. 
Individuals, who after years of discrimination, 
finally reacted out of frustration, were typically 
described as “lacking respect for authority,” 
“hoodlums,” “marauders,” or engaged in “guerilla 
warfare.”47  
 
II. THE NARRATIVE OF BLACK DANGEROUSNESS 
REMAINS PART OF OUR CULTURAL WORLDVIEW 
 
Historian Barbara Fields tells us that “ideas 
about color, like ideas about anything else derive 
their importance, indeed their very definition, from 
their context.”48 The automatic presumption of Black 
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dangerousness is not driven by any sort of 
primordial biological impulse, but is a social 
construct that has been, in President Obama’s 
words, “fed to folks for a long time.” And, the most 
rigorous social science of the last sixty years shows 
that this social construct, ancient as it may be, 
remains part of our cultural worldview. 
 
A. In a Wide Set of Circumstances 
Americans Strongly and 
Automatically Stereotype Blacks as 
Violent Criminals 
 
Social scientists have long confirmed what 
most of us instinctively know: we all carry implicit 
biases against others who we perceive to be different 
from us. In the case of Blacks: 
 
The stereotype of Black Americans as 
violent and criminal has been 
documented by social psychologists for 
almost 60 years.  Researchers have 
highlighted the robustness and 
frequency of this stereotypic association 
by demonstrating its effects on 
numerous outcome variables, including 
people’s memory of who was holding a 
deadly razor in a subway scene, people’s 
evaluation of ambiguously aggressive 
behavior, people’s decisions to 
categorize weapons as weapons, the 
speed at which people decide to shoot 
someone holding a weapon, and the 
probability that they will shoot at all.  









Blacks and crime strong, it also appears 
to be automatic.”49 
 
The Implicit Aptitude Test (“IAT”) is the most 
rigorous study on implicit racial bias and tests 
automatic associations by individuals. The most 
widely known IAT pairs faces of Black or White men 
with “good” or “bad” words. Without fail, the test 
shows that the majority of takers are slower to 
associate Black faces with “good” words. The most 
notable and extreme unconscious biases that social 
scientists have discovered are enduring stereotypes 
of Black people as dangerous, less-than-human 
criminals. Even when people are supposedly 
unaware of historical stereotypes associated with 
Black people, they associate Blacks with qualities 
that fit these historical biases. Thus, an IAT using 
Black and White faces and pictures of apes and non-
ape animals showed that individuals associate Black 
people with apes even though the majority of 
participants indicated that they had never heard of 
the Blacks as apes stereotype.50  
 
But social science research has gone beyond 
just unconscious associations. Cognitive scientists 
and psychologists have used selective-attention 
studies to demonstrate that people feel more 
threatened by Black people than White people.51 The 
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theory of selective attention is that people pay more 
attention to things that are perceived as 
threatening. It originally applied to proven threats 
like spiders and snakes, but studies have discovered 
that Black men are also viewed as threats. For 
example, in one study participants found a dot on a 
screen more quickly if it appeared where there had 
previously been a Black face than if it appeared 
where there had been a White face, demonstrating 
selective attention.52 Another study found that 
people were more likely to misperceive an object as a 
weapon when held by a Black person than when held 
by a White person and are also more likely to shoot 
an unarmed Black person than an unarmed White 
person.53 When people are primed with a Black 
face—meaning it flashes in front of them and they do 
not even realize they have seen it—they are faster to 
identify a gun and more likely to mischaracterize a 
tool as a weapon, whereas when people are primed 
with a White face, they are faster to identify a tool.54 
 
In 2004, scientists from Yale University, 
Stanford University, the Pennsylvania State 
University, and the University of California, Los 
Angeles collaborated on a groundbreaking paper, 
Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing. 
The paper’s findings are striking: “When officers 
were given no information other than a face and 
when they were explicitly directed to make 
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judgments of criminality, race played a significant 
role in how those judgments were made.  Black faces 
looked more criminal to police officers; the more 
Black, the more criminal.”55  Their findings also 
showed that stereotyping Blacks as inherently 
dangerous has a perverse looping effect, in which 
Blackness not only triggers association with 
criminality but also magnifies it; when shown a 
Black face, people who associate Blackness with 
criminality misremember the Black face as even 
more stereotypically Black.  
 
In eerily prescient language, the scientists 
concluded that one inescapable implication of their 
findings is that:  
 
Police officers may face elevated levels of 
danger in the presence of White armed 
suspects in comparison with Black armed 
suspects.  For example, if police officers have a 
delayed response to White suspects with guns 
or knives these officers may be more likely to 
get hurt, shot, or killed when confronting 
White armed suspects in comparison with 
Black suspects.  In contrast, unarmed, 
innocent Blacks may easily become targets of 
intense visual surveillance by both police 
officers and the lay public.  With their eyes, 
perceivers may tie individual Black targets to 
a group-based suspicion—and sadly, Black 
people who appear stereotypically Black may 
be the most likely of all to feel the tug.56   
 
                                               











B. The Stereotype of Black 
Dangerousness Is Constantly 
Reflected in and Reinforced by 
Popular Media  
 
Nowhere is the stereotype of Black 
dangerousness more prevalent than in modern 
popular media.  Today, the most common negative 
stereotypes of Black people are “impressions of 
laziness, murderous violence, and sexual 
intemperance.”57  In that way, all manners of 
national debates about race—from parenting to 
education to housing—are driven by and even 
resolved with this idea of the excessive criminality of 
Black people. 
 
When Richard Sherman, a Black professional 
football player, gave an interview in which he 
asserted that he was the best at his position, he 
sparked extensive attention from news programs 
and on social media. Sherman, who graduated with a 
3.9 GPA from Stanford University, was called 
“classless,” a “monkey,” a “thug,” and “ghetto,” 
among other racial epithets on social media.  Indeed, 
the word “thug” was used 629 times the day after the 
interview.58  Author Ta-Nehisi Coates opined that 
onlookers, incapable of seeing Sherman as an 
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individual, “instead [saw] the sum of all American 
fears—monkey, thug, terrorist, nigger.”59   
 
Political scientist Tali Mendelberg explains 
that in the post-civil rights era, explicit race-based 
appeals that violate norms of equality have been 
replaced by more subtle visual imagery and coded 
language that tap into persistent racial prejudices 
and fears.60  The racially charged word “thug” 
functions much in this manner.  A contemporary 
incarnation of the “Black brute” and “Negro savage” 
archetypes, it connotes violence and brutishness.  In 
2011, for example, the New York Post compared 
tennis player Serena Williams to a “street thug,” 
after she yelled at a chair umpire during the U.S. 
Open.61 Michelle Bachman, Rush Limbaugh, Karl 
Rove, and many others frequently label President 
Obama “thuggish” and a “Chicago thug.”62  
 
The word has been used, too, in the media 
coverage around the recent shooting deaths of young 
Black men.  For instance, when George 
Zimmerman’s defense team released photographs of 
17-year-old Trayvon Martin showing off gold teeth, 
the Washington Post noted how the tactic fed 
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directly into the narrative “painting Trayvon Martin 
as a thug who deserved to die.”63  
 
The narrative that Blacks are inherently 
criminal is emphasized further by the 
overrepresentation of Blacks in crime reporting.64  
One study, which tracked the 2014 news coverage of 
every major New York network affiliate, found that 
while 51 percent of the people arrested by the NYPD 
for violent crime are Black, in evening news coverage 
Blacks were represented as the suspects 75 percent 
of the time.   This narrative also controls what kinds 
of stories are told about Black people and Black 
culture.  The New York Times recently analyzed the 
roles that have earned Black actors Academy 
Awards nominations, revealing how violence and 
criminalization figure prominently in depictions of 
Black life.  Since the first awards show in 1929, 
Black men have been nominated twenty times.  
Thirteen of those performances involved being 
arrested or incarcerated and fifteen involved violent 
or criminal behavior.65  
 
The effect of this relentless narrative is 
significant.  A national survey conducted in 2010 
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asked White respondents to estimate the percentage 
of burglaries, illegal drug sales, and juvenile crime 
committed by Blacks.  The researchers found that 
the respondents overestimated actual Black 
participation in these crimes—measured by 
arrests—by approximately 20 to 30 percent.66  
   
When a narrative is so widely circulated, it 
comes to bear on every aspect of life. For instance, a 
2015 study found that starting at age ten, Blacks 
were viewed as less innocent than other children. 
Researchers showed a group of female K-12 teachers 
identical school records of a fictitious middle school 
student who had misbehaved.  Some teachers 
received the records labeled with a stereotypically 
Black name, while others reviewed records labeled 
with a stereotypically White name. When asked how 
they would respond to the infractions, teachers were 
more likely to escalate the response when the 
student was believed to be Black. The study also 
found that when a student was believed to be Black, 
teachers were more likely to attribute the behavior 
to a larger pattern, rate the incidents as more 
troubling and warranting of discipline, and were 
more likely to predict future suspensions.67   
 
Research also shows that the presence of 
Blacks in a neighborhood correlates to the level of 
perceived crime in that neighborhood.  A 2001 study 
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of residential surveys and police data from Seattle, 
Chicago, and Baltimore found a positive association 
between how residents perceived the level of crime 
in their neighborhood and the percentage of young 
Black men living in that neighborhood, even when 
controlling for a variety of neighborhood 
characteristics.68  A 2004 study by researchers from 
Harvard and the University of Michigan found that 
as the concentration of minority groups in a 
neighborhood increases, residents of all races 
perceive more “disorder,” even after accounting for 
personal characteristics of the respondents and 
neighborhood conditions.69 
 
The idea of Black criminality has become so 
ingrained in the national consciousness that it is 
encapsulated in a single racially coded phrase: 
Black-on-Black crime.  This absurd phrase, which is 
rarely explained but often repeated even by 
supposedly well-meaning people, is meant to 
somehow convey the idea that Blacks are so violent 
that they even kill “their own kind.”  The truth is 
Black intra-racial crime is neither unique nor 
unnatural.  The vast majority of violent crimes are 
intra rather than interracial, and this is particularly 
true in a society that remains as racially segregated 
as ours.  Yet, the fact that in ordinary discourse the 
idea of White on White crime never seems to register 
as a real phenomenon perhaps only goes to show 
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how we have so thoroughly made Blacks villains and 
villains Black. 
 
III. THIS COURT HAS LONG WORKED TO FERRET 
OUT THE USE OF RACE IN THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM  
 
In light of the history and nature of stereotype 
catalogued above, the injection of Mr. Buck’s race 
into his sentencing proceeding is extraordinary 
because for so long this Court has endeavored to 
remove race from the calculus of guilt and 
punishment. Jurisprudential development in 
criminal procedure reflects this Court’s profound 
understanding that racism infects our institutions 
and must be stamped out wherever possible.  
 
A. Race Can Never Be Allowed to Factor 
into the Calculus of Guilt or 
Punishment 
 
Perhaps the central purpose of our criminal 
law is the regulation of undesirable behavior. By 
defining behavior that is undesirable, and by 
prescribing appropriate punishment for that 
behavior, criminal law not only achieves retribution 
but also deters defendants and others from engaging 
in such behavior in the future. The process of 
criminal law, then, involves determining whether a 
defendant engaged in proscribed conduct and 
affording appropriate punishment. A person’s race is 
irrelevant in both matters; allowing race to be 
considered either in determining guilt or in 
proscribing punishment is arbitrary and pernicious. 
Indeed, allowing race to infect criminal law 









criminal justice system. But more than that, 
allowing race to influence a finding of guilt or a 
determination of punishment is morally repugnant.  
 
This Court has long endeavored to protect the 
integrity and fairness of our legal system against the 
effects of the arbitrary consideration of race, 
commanding that courts engage in “unceasing efforts 
to eradicate racial prejudice from our criminal 
justice system” McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 
310 (1987) (internal citation omitted), because 
“[d]iscrimination on the basis of race, odious in all 
aspects, is especially pernicious in the 
administration of justice,” Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 
545, 555 (1979). For example, this Court has 
repeatedly insisted that exclusion of an otherwise 
qualified person from serving on a jury on account of 
race violates due process. See Ex Parte Virginia, 100 
U.S. 339, 345 (1879) (“The Fourteenth Amendment 
secures . . . an impartial jury . . . selected or chosen 
without discrimination against such jurors because 
of their color”); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 
303, 309–10 (1879) (“That colored people are singled 
out and expressly denied by a statute all right to 
participate...as jurors...is practically a brand upon 
them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their 
inferiority, and a stimulant to that race prejudice 
which is an impediment to securing to individuals of 
the race...equal justice.”). See also Foster v. 
Chatman, 578 U. S. ____, 136 S. Ct. 737 (2016) (“The 
Constitution forbids striking even a single 
prospective juror for a discriminatory purpose”); 
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991); Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986); Cassell v. Texas, 









U.S. 587 (1935); Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316, 319 
(1906); Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 447 (1900).  
 
Similarly, this Court has held that selective 
prosecution on the basis of race violates due process. 
See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985); 
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978); 
Oyler v. Boyles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962); Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886).  Notwithstanding 
this Court’s commitment to ferreting out selective 
prosecution on the basis of race, this practice 
continues to infect our criminal justice system, and 
lower federal and state courts continue to confront it.  
In one illustrative case, a Black defendant 
challenged his prosecution on the ground it was 
racially motivated. United States v. Jones, 159 F.3d 
969 (6th Cir. 1998). The defendant pointed to the 
fact that police officers made custom t-shirts 
celebrating his arrest and that of his wife, who was 
also Black, while deliberately leaving out a White 
codefendant, and then sent a postcard of a Black 
woman with bananas on her head to the defendant 
in jail. Id. at 975. The Sixth Circuit found that the 
“undeniably shameful” conduct of the officers “was 
not only outrageous and unprofessional, but also 
racially motivated.”  Id. at 977. 
 
Analogously, prosecution for crack cocaine 
possession or sale has played out along racial lines. 
See, e.g., United States v. Tuitt, 68 F. Supp. 2d 4 (D. 
Mass. 1999) (not a single White defendant 
prosecuted in federal court for crack cocaine charges 
for an entire calendar year in a region that 
encompassed four counties; only Black and Latino 
defendants were prosecuted). As this Court has 









selection process and in the decision whether to 
prosecute, the arbitrary and invidious use of race at 
any point in a criminal proceeding is fundamentally 
unfair and undermines any verdict, judgment or 
sentence.  
B.  Overt and Subtle Racial Appeals 
Unjustly Taint Criminal Proceedings  
Just as allowing race to infect the 
determination of guilt or punishment undermines 
the integrity and fairness of our criminal justice 
system, so, too, do overt and subtle appeals to racial 
bias. Whether by a judge, a prosecutor, or defense 
counsel, an appeal to a jury based on racial prejudice 
poisons our system of justice.  Racial appeals 
undermine principles of fairness and equity, and 
bear no rational relationship to one’s guilt or to the 
proper determination of punishment. 
Notwithstanding the progress from three-fifths of a 
person to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Voting 
Rights Act of 1965, the passage of time and the 
evolution of precedent, “racial and other forms of 
discrimination still remain a fact of life, in the 
administration of justice as in our society as a whole. 
Perhaps today that discrimination takes a form more 
subtle than before. But it is not less real or 
pernicious.” Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 558–59 
(1979). Though overt racial appeals are less frequent 
today, innuendo and insinuation are often used to 
arouse racial prejudice. Barring review of such 
invidious appeals subverts the integrity of the 
criminal justice system. Instead of ensuring fairness, 
procedural rules that bar review of claims of 










Today, too many prosecutors improperly play 
to jurors’ racial biases.  A prosecutor may allude to a 
defendant’s race in connection with a propensity for 
violence by describing that defendant in animalistic 
terms, degrading his or her humanity. See e.g., 
Bennet v. Stirling, 2016 WL 1070812 (D.S.C. Mar. 
16, 2016) (prosecutor compared the Black defendant 
to King Kong, describing his victim, a blonde woman, 
to allude to her being White). Prosecutors may 
reference Black defendants’ relationships with White 
women to stir up racial prejudice, and courts rightly 
find these insinuations irrelevant, racially charged 
and prejudicial. See, e.g., Moore v. Morton, 255 F.3d 
95, 115 (3d Cir. 2001) (prosecutor referenced Black 
defendant's White wife); Bryant v. State, 25 S.W.3d 
924, 925–26 (Tex. App. 2000) (prosecutor referenced 
Black defendant impregnating “a White girl”); 
Dawson v. State, 734 P.2d 221, 223 (1987) 
(prosecutor referenced Black defendant’s irrelevant 
“physical relationship” with White woman); United 
States v. Grey, 422 F.2d 1043, 1044–45 (6th Cir. 
1970) (overturning death sentence where prosecutor 
asked character witness whether he knew the Black 
defendant was “running around with a White go-go 
dancer”). These cloaked racial appeals do not bear on 
guilt or innocence, and have no relevance to 
appropriate punishment; rather these appeals incite 
racial animus for the purpose of securing conviction 
or a stiffer punishment.  
 
Racial appeals, which play on the 
dehumanizing stereotypes discussed above, have no 
place in our criminal justice system, yet they are 
disturbingly routine. See e.g., United States v. 
Cannon, 88 F.3d 1495, 1503 (8th Cir.1996) (holding 









people” was a due process violation); United States v. 
Doe, 903 F.2d 16, 27–28 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (finding 
prosecutor's statement that “Jamaican[s][are] ... 
coming in and they're taking over” and use of “they” 
and “them” was prejudicial); McFarland v. Smith, 
611 F.2d 414, 416, 419 (2d Cir. 1979) (finding 
prosecutor's statement that Black police officer's 
testimony about Black defendant was credible 
because it was “someone she knows and that's a 
member of her own race” created “a distinct risk of 
stirring racially prejudiced attitudes”); Withers v. 
United States, 602 F.2d 124, 125-27 (6th Cir. 1979) 
(“Not one white witness has been produced in this 
case that contradicts [the victim's] position in this 
case”); Miller v. North Carolina, 583 F.2d 701, 707 
(4th Cir. 1978) (finding prosecutor's statement that 
“I argue to you that the average White woman 
abhors anything of this type...with a Black man” in 
rape case violated due process); Kelly v. Stone, 514 
F.2d 18, 19 (9th Cir. 1975) (finding prosecutor asking 
jury to “[t]hink about the consequences of letting a 
guilty man...go free. Because maybe the next time it 
won't be a little Black girl from the other side of the 
tracks; maybe it will be somebody that you know” 
denied Black defendant a fair trial when taken 
together with other inappropriate comments); 
United States ex rel. Haynes v. McKendrick, 481 F.2d 
152, 155, 161 (2d Cir. 1973) (finding Black 
defendants were denied fair trial where prosecutor 
stated defense counsel's “experience with the people 
of the colored race” provided knowledge of “their 
weaknesses and inability to do certain things that 
maybe are commonplace for the ordinary person to 
do.”); State v. Hinton, 43 S.E.2d 360, 361 (1947) 
(prosecutor's statement “I do not ask you to convict 









killed by a negro” found to be reversible error).  
Conjuring racial animus in jurors serves to detract 
from the administration of justice, from the finding 
of truth, and from the fairness of a trial.   
 
Prosecutors “may strike hard blows” but they 
may “not...strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to 
refrain from improper methods calculated to produce 
a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate 
means to bring about a just one.” Berger v. United 
States, 295 U.S. 78, 87 (1935). Because racial 
appeals so thoroughly taint the fairness of a trial, 
such appeals are just as illegitimate when made by 
defense counsel as they are when made by a 
prosecutor.  See e.g., Kornegay v. State, 174 Ga. App. 
279, 280 (1985) (finding error not harmless where 
defense counsel stated “Y'all niggers 40 or 50 years 
ago would be lynched for something like this, but 
you're not under the law guilty of rape because these 
people are just as guilty as you are”). Racial appeals 
brought by any party inject racial animus into a 
process that should be void of bias.  Indeed, any 
introduction of a racial appeal has an irreversible 
impact on the entire proceeding, jeopardizing the 
validity of any findings or determinations: there is 
no way of discerning whether the result rests on 
reasonable inferences made from the evidence or 
bias engendered through racial appeals.  
 
C. This Court Has Routinely Interpreted 
Procedural Rules and Bars to Permit 
Review of Impermissible Uses of Race  
 
It is “incontestable that the death penalty 
inflicted on one defendant is ‘unusual’ if it 









religion, wealth, social position, or class, or if it is 
imposed under a procedure that gives room for the 
play of such prejudices.” Furman v. Georgia, 408 
U.S. 238, 242 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) 
(emphasis added). This Court’s jurisprudence with 
respect to procedure has reflected Justice Douglas’ 
sentiment in Furman. That is, “procedural 
rules…are designed to enhance the accuracy of a 
conviction or sentence,” Montgomery v. Louisiana, 
136 S.Ct. 718, 730 (2016), and where proceedings 
have been infected with racial discrimination, 
procedural rules cannot shield such prejudice from 
review.  
 
Just last term this Court addressed exclusions 
of jurors because of their race and reaffirmed its 
unconstitutionality. See Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. 
____, 136 S.Ct. 737 (2016). Yet such a meritorious 
claim may have eluded review were it not for a 
favorable finding on subject matter jurisdiction. 
While this Court could have found that Georgia’s res 
judicata doctrine barred review of the defendant’s 
Batson claim, it instead chose to review the merits of 
the claim. Id. at 1746–47.  Procedure should bend 
toward fairness and justice. Nearly 140 years ago in 
Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879), this Court 
considered a procedural barrier to reviewing the 
merits of habeas petitions from district courts. In 
deciding whether this Court had jurisdiction to grant 
the writ, the Court held the claims should be 
reviewed “in favor of liberty.” Id. at 337. Further, in 
Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411 (1991), this Court 
found that Georgia’s implementation of procedural 
bars to Batson claims was impermissible. In Ford 
this Court could well have found Georgia’s 









the petitioner’s claim had already been reviewed 
under the standards set out in Swain v. Alabama, 
380 U.S. 202 (1965) (overruled on other grounds by 
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)); it instead 
rejected application of the bar and remanded the 
case for consideration of the merits of the 
defendant’s claims.  Ford, 498 U.S. at 425. 
 
Similarly, in other contexts, this Court has not 
hesitated to reach the merits of claims raising 
substantial constitutional questions notwithstanding 
the availability of procedural escape hatches. For 
example, in NFIB v. Sebelius, this Court held that 
review of the challenges to the individual mandate in 
the Affordable Care Act was not barred by the Anti-
Injunction Act. 567 U. S. ____ (2012), 132 S. Ct. 
2566, 2582–84, 2593–601 (2012). See also 26 U.S.C. § 
7421(a); 26 U.S.C. §§ 5000(a), (g)(2). And in Knox v. 
SEIU, 567 U. S. ____ (2012), 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012), 
this Court rejected the defendant’s mootness claim 
in part based on the proposition that “as long as the 
parties have a concrete interest, however small, in 
the outcome of the litigation, the case is not moot.” 
Id. at 2288 (quoting Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 
435, 442 (1984). Sebelius and Knox demonstrate that 
where this Court confronts a profound constitutional 
question, whether it involves the impermissible use 
of race, or some other constitutional imperative, 
precedent and practice allow for review in close 
cases. Procedure may bend without breaking. 
 
This Court has ensured review of state court 
decisions of federal questions by avoiding state 
procedural bars, unless those bars are “strictly or 
regularly followed.” Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 









inadequate and reviewing state court decision 
ordering election without compliance with Voting 
Rights Act). Where this Court has acknowledged 
steep procedural barriers, it has also conceived just 
exceptions. For example, federal habeas review of 
federal claims is barred where there is an adequate 
and independent finding of procedural default on 
state law ground, except where failure to review the 
claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of 
justice. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).  
 
Mr. Buck’s case is alive because of this Court’s 
acknowledgment of steep procedural bars unjustly 
foreclosing review of constitutional violations. This 
Court recognized in Martinez v. Ryan that review of 
state convictions and sentences are guided by 
procedural “rules designed to ensure that state-court 
judgments are accorded the finality and respect 
necessary to preserve the integrity of legal 
proceedings within our system of federalism.” 132 
S.Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012). See also Trevino v. Thaler, 
133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013) (extending Martinez to Texas 
criminal appeals). Implicit in this principle is that 
state sentences must be subject to review where the 
integrity of legal proceedings is threatened. There is 
no greater corruption of a sentencing proceeding 
than an overt claim that the defendant’s race is a 
factor that may be considered in assessing a 
defendant’s future dangerousness. 
 
Procedural rules are not absolutes; they are 
forged in service of principles of fairness, accuracy 
and justice. This Court has rightly given way to 
substantive law where procedural rules may have 
barred such review, particularly where there were 









involves a death sentence infected by overt racial 
appeals, a finding of future dangerousness tainted by 
reference to Mr. Buck’s race. This Court should 
properly find these circumstances extraordinary and 




For all the aforementioned reasons, the 
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